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COMMENT
RELOCATION, ACCIDENTAL INEQUALITIES, AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
In a meritorious endeavor to clear the slums and rehouse the
poor, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949.1 The declaration of
policy in the Act expresses the intention to strive for no less than a
"decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family," ' while section 105(c) boldly guarantees "decent, safe, and
sanitary" housing for displacees forced to vacate slum clearance
projects. 3 Section 105(c) further provides for the conditions of the
contract between the local planning agency (LPA) and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)--originally the Housing
and Home Finance Agency (HHFA)-to preclude the grant of
federal funds until HUD has determined that the rehousing offered
displacees has satisfied or will satisfy the statutory standards.4
I Ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413.
Housing Act of 1949, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), as amended, (Supp. III,

2

1968).

The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation
and the health and living standards of its people require housing production
and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing
shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through
the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as
feasible of the goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family . . . . The Housing and Home Finance Agency
and its constituent agencies . . . shall exercise their powers, functions, and
duties under this or any other law, consistently with the national housing
policy declared by this Act ....
3 Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 105 (c), 63 Stat. 416, originally provided:
Contracts for financial aid shall be made only with a duly authorized local
public agency and shall require that(c) There be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of families
displaced from the project area, and that there are or are being provided, in
the project area or in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to
public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices
within the financial means of the families displaced from the project area,
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to the number of and
available to such displaced families and reasonably accessible to their places
of employment ....
Section 105(c) was subsequently strengthened by the 1964 amendment, which
extended coverage to individuals as well as families and required that each local
planning agency institute a relocation assistance program to meet the needs of displacees. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
4 Prior to the creation of HUD, the HHFA Administrator had been charged
with the non-delegable responsibility for making the statutory feasibility decision.
42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964). This decision-making responsibility is now the function
of the Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance within the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. 31 Fed. Reg. §§ 8964-65 (1966). See also
§ 105(c) (2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2) (Supp. III, 1968).
(579)
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By combining this Act with existing public housing titles,5
Congress hoped that public housing would fill the gap created by the
extreme shortage of adequate private housing, and serve as the primary
source of relocation for displacees.6 By the 1950's, however, public
housing had suffered serious setbacks at the local levels where it was
7
administered.
Too liberal in concept for conservatives and too conservative in
practice for liberals, public housing reached its nadir in 1954, when
Congress, reflecting public apathy, cut the annual authorization from
135,000 to a mere 35,000 units.8 Slum clearance, rather than being
curtailed, simply changed its emphasis. Staggered by the flow of the
white middle class to the suburbs, urban leaders saw in renewal
projects a method of rebuilding their eroded tax base. Rather than
build low income public housing to relocate displacees, local administrators decided to emphasize the construction of shopping centers,
office buildings, luxury apartments and expensive townhouses, to lure
tax dollars back to the city.' The concern, then, shifted to attracting
the suburban rich rather than rehousing the urban poor. Local planning agencies and the federal government became less and less concerned with the misfortunes of displacees.'0
Due to this neglect, slum dwellers no longer could hope to gain
the promised "decent" housing and all the benefits that accrue from it;
in fact, slum clearance soon put their very welfare in jeopardy. Studies
show that upon notice of eviction from his home the typical displacee
could expect to spend great lengths of time searching for shelter only
to find rehousing that was more expensive, more crowded, and less
adequate than the "slum" from which he had been displaced."
This displacement has not been random in its effect; on the contrary, the process has worked selectively. Renewal critics point out
GE.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1410 (1964).
6See generally HHFA, THE RELATIONSHIP BETwEEi SLUM CLEARANCE AND
URBAN REDEvELOPmENT AND LOW-RENT HOUSING (1950), as cited in Note, Judicial
Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YAI L. . 966, 980 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Displacee Relocation].
7 It should be noted that the statute and its legislative history emphasize that the
planning and administration of these programs are a local responsibility. Housing
Act of 1949, §§ 2, 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1451 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 27 (1949).
8 C. ABRAMS, TEE CITY Is THE FRONTIER 80 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ABRs];
R. FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 102 (1959).
9 See Von Eckhardt, Black Neck in a White Noose, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 19, 1963,
at 15; Von Eckhardt, Bulldozers and Bureaucrats,NEw RPUBLIC, Sept. 14, 1963, at
14; Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on
Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 198 (1968) [hereinafter
cited 0as Tondro].
3 For a discussion of the new emphasis and the consequent neglect of displacees
on the part of both the LPAs and the federal government, see ABRAM S 132-54.
11 E.g., Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families, 30 J. Am. INST. PLANNxRS
270-78 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hartman]. Hartman bases his conclusions on ex-

tensive analysis of previous investigations of relocation as well as his own empirical
research on relocation in the Boston West End i'enewal area. His conclusions are,
furthermore, representative of other critics. See also Tondro 226.

1969]

RELOCATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION

that approximately two-thirds of the people forced out of their homes
each year are Negroes, Puerto Ricans, or members of some other
minority group. 2 The normal burden of finding decent living quarters
is magnified for them by the intense and rampant discrimination in the
housing market. 3
For example, while it may take the white displacees weeks to
relocate, it takes the nonwhite months. While the white displacee
may utilize real estate agencies and newspapers, the nonwhite must
often rely on informal information provided by family and friends.
Furthermore, the prospective Negro homeowner experiences much
more difficulty in securing adequate financing than his white counterpart. 4 In addition, when the search is over, nonwhites invariably end
up with housing that is higher priced, more crowded, and substantially
less habitable than that obtained by the white displacee. Finally, the
nonwhite usually ends up in a highly segregated slum area that is the
target of urban renewal projects yet to come. Thus, the cycle of
injustice repeats itself and nonwhites are kicked around from one
project site to the next.'"
This process has left psychological scars not only on the nonwhite
displacees, but on society as a whole. Renewal has come to mean the
displacement of nonwhites by whites or by the symbols of white culture;
and, therefore, many Negroes have come to regard renewal not as a
cure for society's ills, but as a deliberate conspiracy by the white power
structure to displace them because they are black. 6
Because the traditional legislative and administrative institutions
have not been responsive to the plight of nonwhite displacees, grievances
concerning relocation have quite predictably, and appropriately, shifted
to the courtroom.' 7 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency 's represents a recent, sensitive response by the federal courts
to this problem. 9 It will serve as the focal point of discussion here.
1 Hartman 273-74; Tondro 184.
13 Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449, 449 n.6 (1968) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
14 See U.S. ADVISORY CommIssIoN ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIoNs, RELoCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES

DISPLACED BY GOVERN-

MENT 34-35 (1965).

' Hartman 273-74.
'6 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESS AND THE NATION 469 (1965). The
assertion that "urban renewal is Negro removal" was made by author James Baldwin
on a television program in May of 1963. This phrase has gained some measure of
recognition as many urban renewal critics have used it of late. See Tondro 185.
Wolf Von Eckhardt adds: "Many a high cost and high rise apartment project has
been developed with tax money solely to stop Negro encroachment into some alderman's district." Von Eckhardt, Bulldozers and Bureaucrats, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
14, 1963, at 14, 17.
17 See Note, Displacee Relocation 969.
18 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
19 It has been well settled that state remedies are inadequate.
21; see also Note, Displacee Relocation 969, n.15.

E.g., Tondro 219-
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v. NORWALK REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY

The plaintiffs in Norwalk CORE represent a collection of interest
groups and individuals concerned with gross mistreatment of nonwhites displaced from a large urban renewal project.2 0 The defendants,
equally diverse, include institutions and their directors ranging from
the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency (NRA) to Dr. Robert C. Weaver,
then Secretary of HUD."' Allegations in the complaint asserted
typical examples of the difficulties nonwhites encounter in the displacement process.
The plaintiffs claimed that the NRA had experienced certain
problems in planning for the project. Realizing that the Norwalk
housing market was extremely limited due to discrimination in the
private sector and long waiting lists for public housing, it allegedly
proceeded to submit distorted relocation statistics in order to have
the renewal project approved by HUD. Once the project was approved
and initiated, the NRA reportedly refused to modify its plans and
continued to displace nonwhites into the overcrowded market. Furthermore, in lieu of constructing desperately needed low-income public
housing on the site's last available piece of land, the NRA contracted
for the construction of a six-acre, ninety-unit, moderate-rent apartment
complex completely beyond the financial reach of nonwhite displacees.
The complaint states that as a result of these maneuvers, nonwhites
were forced into overcrowded, high-rent slums, and in some cases were
literally driven out of the city.'
Plaintiffs based their complaints on the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the amended section 105 (c) of the
Housing Act of 1949.2 They were turned away from the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut on the grounds
that they had not presented a proper class action under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that neither the associations
nor the individuals had "standing to challenge the official conduct
here in question." 2' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
20

Plaintiffs consisted of the Norwalk Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality,

2 non-profit tenants' associations comprised of low income Negroes and Puerto Ricans,
and 8 individuals representing 4 classes of low income Negroes and Puerto Ricans:
(a) those who were still living in the project area; (b) those who had been displaced
into overcrowded rental units; (c) those who bad been displaced into excessive rental
values; and, (d) those who had been forced outside the City of Norwalk.
21 Defendants were the Norwalk Housing Authority, its Executive Director and
members; the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, its Administrator and members; the
city of Norwalk, its mayor and city clerk; Town House Gardens, Inc.; David Katz &
Sons, Inc.; Charles J. Horn, Assistant Regional Administrator for Renewal Assistance
of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Dr. Robert C.
Weaver, Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.
22395 F2d at 924-25.

2342 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. III, 1968).
24 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617, 622
(D. Conn. 1967). The class action issue is not discussed in this Comment.
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reversed, holding that plaintiffs had standing to raise both the equal
protection and the statutory issues and that they had indeed presented
a proper class action. The case was remanded to the district court
to be heard on the merits.
This decision is important for two reasons. The case marks the
first time that a court has unequivocally removed the procedural roadblocks facing plaintiffs concerned with inadequate and improper methods
of relocation, thus thrusting the judiciary into the position of reviewing
the relocation plans and practices of governmental agencies.25 Second,
although the court did not reach the substantive issue in the case, it did
provide some insight into the scope of the rights granted to displacees
and the effect those rights might have on future litigation.
Equal Protection
The plaintiffs in Norwalk CORE based two of their three claims
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment: first, that
the relocation program in Norwalk operated to deny the plaintiffs the
equal protection of the laws; and second, that "the local defendants
had intended to deprive low income Negro, and Puerto Rican families
of the equal protection of the laws, and have intended to force such
families out of the city." 26 The second claim thus follows the
traditional approach to the doctrine: that equal protection is violated
when the government, without adequate justification, either takes
action with the purpose of disadvantaging a particular group, or, whatever its motives, takes different actions with respect to one group as
compared with another, and thereby disadvantages one of the groups.2
The first claim, however, complains neither of an intent to harm one
group more than others, nor of different actions taken for different
groups; rather, the allegation simply refers to impartial governmental
action that affects all site residents, but results in unequal consequences
for nonwhite displacees.
During the rise of the civil rights movement in the early 1960's,
a body of literature developed which served to clarify and justify this
2
latter approach to the equal protection doctrine. " It was felt that
25 Representative of earlier federal cases denying standing to displacees are Green
Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967);
Johnson v. Oakland Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963); Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310
F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). There is one trial
court decision which granted standing for limited purposes, Powelton Civic Home
Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
26395 F.2d at 925 (emphasis added). The language quoted is the court's.
27
See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World, 61 Nw. U. L. Rlx.
363 (1966) ; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L.

REv. 341 (1949).

28
E.g., N. HENToV, TEE NEw EouALITY 97-112 (1964) ; Kaplan, supra note 27;
Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 400 (1964).
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when one group in society has been mistreated for an extended period
of time, it accrues many social, economic and political liabilities that
seriously hamper its members' chances to function within that society.
Therefore, when the government administers programs with rigid
equality, the disadvantaged group either is unable to benefit to the same
extent or is subjected to a heavier burden than the rest of the community because of deficiencies in the requisite fundamental background.
Those who are prepared advance, while the disadvantaged fall farther
behind. The result would not be much different if the government had
intended to harm or had taken different actions against the disadvantaged groups from the very beginning.29
Advocates of this view saw similarities to the special compensatory
treatment given the physically disadvantaged in our society, and reasoned that the same approach should be applied to the sociologically
disadvantaged." Hence, to achieve an ideal balance, some groups
should be treated unequally in order to equalize the final effect of
governmental action.
In Hobson v. Hansen 31 the District Court for the District of
Columbia dramatically inaugurated this approach to the equal protection
clause when reviewing the educational policies of the District's school
board. 3 2 The plaintiffs argued that the board's policies were diluting
the quality of education provided for Negro school children. They
alleged that a "neighborhood school" policy fostered de facto segregation,33 and that a "culturally biased" ability-grouping test administered in the earlier grades, using predominantly middle class vocabulary
and language forms, invariably relegated Negroes to inferior curricular
groupings.3 4 Although the court found enough positive factors in these
85
policies to decide that the school board did not intend to harm Negroes,
and although both the neighborhood school policy and the ability group2

9 See N. HENToFF, THE NEW EQUALrry 96-112 (1964).
30 Id.
B1 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, No. 21, 168 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1969)
(en banc).
3
2 See Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision, of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HAav. L. Rxv. 1511 (1968).
3 TheDistrict of Columbia school authorities followed a "neighborhood school
policy" under which students were assigned to schools near their homes. In 11 of the
17 schools in the predominantly white northwestern section of the District, 85 to 100%
of the students enrolled were white. In the remainder of the District, 139 of the 156
schools had a Negro enrollment of at least 85%. The student enrollment throughout
the entire District was 90.2% Negro. 269 F. Supp. at 410-12.
34These were nationally standardized examinations, which were developed as a
means to distinguish students of differing aptitude in an effort to provide a viable
basis for grouping that would avoid the inherent problems of a single curriculum
too slow for gifted children and too demanding for others. According to expert testimony, these exams utilized a vocabulary and language forms alien to lower-class Negro
children. The most important result averted to was that children who did poorly on
the exams would be placed for the remainder of their educational career into a program
designed to teach only basic concepts and geared to menial jobs. Id. at 511-15.
35 269 F. Supp. at 418.
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ing test were applied to all students, it still held that Negroes were receiving unequal treatment because their particular social problems
were not being taken into consideration. The court ordered that
affirmative steps be taken, such as busing some Negro children to
white schools, to reduce de facto segregation. 30 Where de facto segregation could not be overcome "because of the density of social segregation or for other reasons," the court indicated that compensatory
educational programs would have to be provided. 37 In addition, the
school board was ordered to abolish the ability-grouping system; 38
however, the court may have left the door open for a modified version
if the grouping is combined with compensatory programs and Negroes
are provided an opportunity to work their way out of lower "ability"
groups. The Hobson court thus adopted the equal protection concept
mentioned above: it required that unequal attention be paid to disadvantaged Negro children in order to insure that the final effects of
governmental action would be substantially equal.
The court in Norwalk CORE, quoting from Hobson, apparently
adopted the expansive concept developed in that case.39 Unfortunately,

however, the extent to which the court embraced this concept is not
clear. In its discussion of whether there was standing to raise the equal
protection issues, the court came to two conclusions. First, the allegations in the complaint of an intent to harm, if proved, would constitute
The court also held that
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.'
even if the harm done was not purposeful in the administration of the
relocation plan, but was simply "accidental" to it, the planners are not
excused from insuring that nonwhite rehousing reaches the same level
4
as that available to white displacees. "
The decision could be said to declare that a failure on the part
of LPAs to provide nonwhites with rehousing meeting the same
standards as rehousing found by whites constitutes a violation of the
equal protection clause. 42 The Norwalk complaint-failure even to be
rehoused at all within the city-easily falls within this expansive
category and thus, if proved, would be a violation of the equal protection clause. Although it could be argued that the Norwalk decision
simply held that deliberate discrimination without sufficient justification,
3O Id.

at 509.

37 Id. at 515.
38 Id.
3
OSee 395 F.2d at 931.

395 F.2d at 930-31.
See 395 F.2d at 931.
42 The theory that there can be a denial of equal protection by government action
that is applied equally to all without an intent to harm one group in particular may be
restricted by a requirement that the unequal effects of the relevant government action
be reasonably foreseeable. The facts of both Norwalk and Hobsen come within this
narrower rule, and thus may leave undecided the question whether a denial of equal
protection may result from government action with discriminatory consequences that
were not reasonably foreseeable.
40

41
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if alleged and proved, constitutes a violation of equal protection, it
would be hard to support such an argument against the emphatic
language of the court.
Aside from its obvious substantive advantage to displacees, the
former approach would also ease evidentiary burdens. Under the
latter interpretation plaintiffs must prove a state of mind,4 3 whereas
the former concept would merely require the showing of an unfavorable
comparison between facilities available to whites and nonwhites.
Despite problems of interpretation, it seems that the expansive
approach can be strongly supported by the language of Norwalk
CORE. As the court concluded its discussion of the equal protection
doctrine, it expressed its concern for the problem of classification by
race.44 Classification according to race (which the court says may be
required in order to remedy injustice 45) becomes an issue only if the
expansive approach is accepted: the LPA would be required to know
exactly how many nonwhites would be displaced and the Authority
would thereby be forced to take into account the full problem of displacement. The court concluded that racial classification for beneficial
purposes is permissible.4 ' Furthermore, there is the clear language that
discriminatory results of a program administered with equality are
not excusable merely because they are accidental.4 7 Thus, it would
seem that the court would not have concerned itself with classification
and "accidents" unless it had intended the expansive approach to be the
standard in relocation problems. For purposes of further discussion,
the expansive concept will be considered as the approach of the
Norwalk court.
Section 105(c) of the Housing Act
Even a cursory reading of section 105(c) 8 reveals Congress's
concern for families inadequately relocated. In light of this concern
one would expect that such families would have little difficulty in
obtaining judicial relief. Until the Norwalk opinion, however, such
40
was not the case. In Green Street Association v. Daley, a relocation
problem similar to that in Norwalk was involved. The court held,
inter alia, that section 105 (c) conferred no private legal right upon
50
displacees and consequently that displacees have no standing to sue.
43 Of course, the state of mind may be inferred from the action if the latter is
discriminatory on its face. For example, a plan denying rehousing assistance only to
Negroes would presumably fall without further evidence of "intent."
44 395 F.2d at 931-32.
45 Id.
48 Id.

47See text accompanying note 41 supra.
4842 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. 111, 1968).
49 373 F.2d
0 Id. at 8.

1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
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Similarly, Johnson v. Oakland Redevelopment Agency "' held that
section 105 (c) provides only that the relocation requirements be included in loans or capital grants and that the requirements are merely
contractual rights possessed by the federal government; therefore,
reasoned the court, the requirements cannot be enforced by displacees. 2
The Norwalk court dealt with these arguments by asserting that
"the cases make it clear that the answer [to the question whether the
displacees are 'aggrieved' within the meaning of section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act,5" thus enabling them to obtain judicial
review] turns on whether Congress' purpose in enacting [section
105 (c)] was to protect their interests." " Looking to the legislative
history, the court concluded that Congress did have a deep and abiding
concern for the hardship of displacees and intended to protect their
Once this concern was established, the court denied the
interests.'
validity of defendants' "contract rights" theory, and stated that although Congress wanted the relocation provisions enforced by the
federal government through contractual remedies, it is not inconsistent
with that desire to allow another enforcement check by permitting dissatisfied displacees to air their grievances in court. 56
The Green Street holding was also dismissed because of that
decision's total reliance on Harrison-HalstedCommunity Group, Inc.
v. Housing & Home Finance Agency." To the Norwalk court, the
Harrison-Halsteddecision dealt primarily with commercial concerns
and refused standing on the basis of a string of precedents holding
that "injury through economic competition is generally not a sufficient
basis for standing to sue." 5' However, the Norwalk court points out
that even an economic interest can be the basis for standing when there
is a statute that is intended to protect such an interest. Thus, the
court concludes, if economic interest can support standing where the
statute is one intended to protect those interests, the interests of displacees, which here are a focus of congressional concern, can also sup51317 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
52Id.

at 874. For a full discussion of these cases, see Tondro, .upra note 9, at

205-14.
53 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1967).

54 395 F.2d at 933.
55

The Bill sets up adequate safeguards against any undue hardship resulting
from the undertaking of slum clearance under current conditions. It requires,
first, that no slum-clearance project shall be undertaken by a local public
agency unless there is a feasible means for the temporary relocation of the
families to be displaced and unless adequate permanent housing is available,
or is being made available to them.

395 F.2d at 933, quoting S. RFt. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. &AD. NEvs 1550, 1554 (1949).
&6395 F.2d at 934.
57310 F2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).

58 395 F2d at 935.
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port standing. 9 Hence, displacees should possess legally enforceable
rights under the statute.60

II.

THE NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

It appears that the high standards of section 105(c) 61 would
provide more than adequate protection for slum dwellers. It seems
odd, therefore, that a court would turn legal somersaults to develop
the expansive approach-an approach which provides only relative
protection to nonwhite displacees and virtually no substantial aid to
Closer examination of section 105(c), however,
white displacees
reveals imperfections making the expansive equal protection approach
a necessary legal sword for nonwhite displacees.
Remedial relief under section 105 (c) will most likely consist of
enjoining renewal projects until the rights granted by the statute are
Such injunctions may be extremely
accorded nonwhite displacees.'
serious, however, because whatever immoralities are perpetrated on
urban renewal's behalf, its existence has been deemed vital to the
regrowth of the cities.64 If section 105 (c) were to be the basis of
relief, renewal projects would be halted until "decent, safe, and
sanitary" rehousing could be provided for slum dwellers. The problem
is that housing meeting this statutory ideal is, of course, quite scarce.65
Hence, not only would it be impossible to provide the statutory ideal
for nonwhites, but undoubtedly similar problems would be 6met in
providing such housing for the less burdened white displacees. 1
6

9 Id. at 935-36.
6oId. The court also suggested that since relocation is in the public interest,
therefore anybody affected by inadequate relocation might be able to sue on the basis

of

§ 105 (c). See 395 F.2d at 934; see also Tondro, supra note 9, at 212-14.
6142 U.S.C. § 1455(c)
62

(Supp. III, 1968).

The suggestion has been made that § 105(c) only relates to judicial review of
the activities of HUD. Thus, at least absent the acceptance of a third party beneficiary theory, statutory remedial relief might only be fashioned by compelling HUD
to withhold funds from the LPA or to take other measures that would compel the
LPA's to halt the projects. See Tondro, .upra note 9, at 221-24. Such a remedy
might be ineffective with the Norwalk project, however, because that project was in
a late stage, and also because stopping the project is not desirable. Therefore, with
no direct statutory relief against the local planning agency available, the constitutional
equal protection argument-which is directed at the LPA and can require particular
action-might be extremely important. However, as valid as this theory may be, the
court at most implies it in its opinion, 395 F.2d at 926 n.7, 929, 935, and furthermore
does not make clear whether their grant of standing encompasses the third-party beneficiary theory.
63 See Tondro, supra note 9, at 223-24.
64 See, e.g., ABRAms, supra note 8, at 180.
65 Were this scarcity not a fact, there would be no desperate outcry by social
critics for a minimum of 6,000,000 new public housing units in the next 5 years.
See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADviSORY CommiassSoN ON CivmL DISORDERS 475 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
66
While most authors agree that the burdens of relocation fall hardest on the
nonwhite, implicit in their accounts of relocation is the fact that whites encounter their
share of the difficulties also. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 11, at 280.
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Obviously, if courts enjoin projects until the statutory ideal is
met, and if this is applied on a wide enough scale, the effect will be to
halt renewal until massive amounts of public housing are provided or
the standards of section 1 05(c) are watered down by Congress. The
former is improbable at present, and the latter is unlikely due to the
brickbats that even the most conservative congressman would harvest
by repudiating such an idealistic concept.
In view of the prospects of long range injunctions, LPAs (whose
survival is vitally tied to renewal) would probably be motivated to
distort relocation figures for the courts just as they do for HUD.67
Charles Abrams, a prominent writer in the field, seriously criticized a
1963 report published by the federal government based solely on the
findings of individual LPAs.'s The report indicated that only 7.8
per cent of slum dwellers were relocated into substandard rehousing.
Abrams argued that this remarkably rosy picture was a result of the
subjective nature of determining what is "standard" rehousing. The
values used by the LPA's in judging the concept of "standard" rehousing are not those of middle class America, or even those of the
slum dwellers. Instead, they are the values created by the LPA's
themselves, who have too great an interest in labeling all rehousing
as "standard" so they can proceed with the task at hand (renewal
rather than relocation) and so they can avoid delay or criticism from
other concerned institutions or the public. 9 Thus, the ideal notion of
rehousing fostered by the statute becomes twisted into a simplistic
notion of having a roof over one's head.7"
The Norwalk court leaves room for further dissipation of the
statutory standard. In the conclusion of its discussion of section
105(c), it makes the following observation:
In determining whether there has been compliance with
section 105(c) of the Act, the courts will evaluate agency
efforts and success at relocation with a realistic awareness of
the problems facing urban renewal programs. Objections by
individual displacees based on too literal an interpretation of
the act's standards could unnecessarily interfere with programs of benefit to the entire community.71
107 E.g., ABRAms, supra note 8, at 141-45; see also Tondro, supra note 9, at 194-95,
199-200, 215-16.

Gs See AmAms, supra note 8, at 138-39.
6

0 Id. at 140-41.

70 One revealing insight into this problem is depicted by Terry Tondro when he
cites an admission of "visual inspections through automobile windshields" by an
embarrassed LPA whose inaccurate figures were discovered by the Government Accounting Office. Tondro, supra note 9, at 194.
71395 F.2d at 936-37.
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A court that is hesitant to intervene in renewal policy decisions and
faced with the task of judging rehousing facilities for several hundred
displacees might easily seize upon this dictum and LPA statistics in
order to approve the rehousing in question. In this way, it could avoid
completely upsetting renewal machinery, and thereby antagonizing
powerful interest groups.
Upon realization of the weakness inherent in enforcement of
section 105(c), it becomes apparent that the Norwalk court had sufficient reason to develop the expansive equal protection doctrine. This
concept does not deal in terms of an unattainable goal, but rather
provides a lower and more realistic standard: LPA's must comply with
statutory requirements in relocating nonwhite displacees to the same
extent they do in white relocation. Therefore, the nonwhite rehousing
would not be matched against an unrealistic statutory requirement, but
rather against provisions made for white displacees whose rehousing,
although superior to that of nonwhites, may fall below the statutory
requirements. In addition, once the standard of relocation for area
whites has been established, it will be more concrete than the abstract
concept of "decent, safe, and sanitary" housing.
To achieve such equal relocation, the 1964 amendment to section
105 (c) 7 and the implicit recommendations of the Norwalk court would
require the LPAs to establish special aids and programs designed to
relocate nonwhites in adequate rehousing facilities.7" This could
conceivably begin with having LPA representatives contact potential
displacees before nonwhites have been frightened away by the prospect
of being homeless, 74 and supplying them with information concerning
both realtors and available housing within the area, as well as being
responsible for busing displacees to the new housing market area.
Moreover, the LPA could establish a site office in the project area to
afford displacees easy access to services offered and demonstrate the
LPA's concern for their condition.7 5 Several renewal critics have regarded this type of organization and concern on the part of LPA's as
the easiest and most fundamental approach toward alleviating injustices in relocation.76 In addition, the LPA could serve as a reference
service by channeling the various types of federal aid, for example the
provisions of the recent housing act, Housing and Urban Development
72

See note 3 supra.
73 395 F.2d at 931-32, 935-36. As suggested above, it may be that the equal protection claim is necessary to directly force the LPA to do anything. See note 62 stpra.
74 Some studies have shown that in certain projects as many as 25% or even 50%
of the site residents never get the benefit of any relocation services because they are
frightened away before any public agency can contact them. See, e.g., Tondro, 47upra
note 9, at 193-94.
7 p. NIEBANCK, RFLOCATION IN URBAN PLANNING: FROM OBSTACLE TO OPiPORTUNrrv 78, 88 (1968). For a comprehensive review of possible LPA programs to aid

displacees, see id. at 75-107.
76 See Hartman, mtpra note 11, at 329-30, 342.
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Act, 7 to displacees. These programs will be of little help unless some
local planning body is responsible for describing them to those needing
relief and for referring those same people to the appropriate agencies.
Furthermore, fresh assistance could come from the recent open housing act in Congress, the Civil Rights Act of 1968,78 and the recent decision of the Supreme Court, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 9 to provide
some remedies against discrimination in the private housing market. 0
LPAs not only could inform nonwhite displacees (and especially their
interest groups) of their rights under these recent developments, but
also could make use of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
This law gives HUD the responsibility of investigating discrimination
in the housing market with an eye towards conciliation, 8 and the
Attorney General the right to bring civil suits where there is a pattern
of discrimination or any denial of the specified rights if the denial
raises an issue of public importance."
Hence, when the LPA encounters discrimination in its local community, HUD could attempt to
arbitrate the matter. Should HUD's attempts fail, both the LPA and
77

Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448 (August 1,
1968). Generally, this Act was intended to provide 1.7 million units of new and rehabilitated housing for low income families within the next 3 years. In addition, it
will provide low income families with rent supplements and loans for prospective
homeowners among them. This Act will be truly effective only if Congress sees fits to
appropriate funds in order that this goal of public housing may be achieved.
78 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat 73 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.). Generally, the housing provisions of this Act prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in selling or renting
housing, as well as in the services for selling and renting housing such as advertising,
real estate and financial services. It will go into effect in 3 stages over a 3 year
period, and by the end of that period over 80 per cent of the housing market will be
covered by it. Exempted from the provisions of the Act are private individuals owning
not more than 3 houses who sold their houses without a real estate broker and without
advertising; also exempted are dwellings of up to 4 separate living units in which the
owner maintains a residence.
79 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court here held that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, now 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), barred any racial discrimination, private or public,
in the sale or rental of housing. In contrast to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, it deals
only with racial discrimination and not discrimination based on religion or national
origin. It does not deal with advertising and does not provide special federal assistance
to aggrieved parties. Furthermore, it does not specifically cover real estate or financial
services. On the other hand, the 1866 Act contains no exemptions and is enforceable
by private parties acting on their own initiative.
0 It has been suggested that even granting effective remedies against discrimination, many Negroes may be unwilling to be "pioneers" in white neighborhoods. See
S. GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 58-9 (1965). This basic reluctance,
however, would not seem to present an overwhelming obstacle. First, Greer himself
presents evidence that a concerned promotion on the part of a sensitive LPA can
overcome this reluctance. Id. at 57-8. Second, this fear would decrease if a reasonable number of displacees from the same project area were rehoused together in a
neighborhood not completely foreign from their former residences. Third, the civil
rights movement's support of open housing would seem to indicate that many nonvhites will accept housing in previously all-white neighborhoods.
81 Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 808(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3608(a) (Supp. 1968).
82

Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 813(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a) (Supp. 1968).
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HUD could inform the Attorney General, who could bring civil suits
against the obstructionists.
If the "expansive" goal proves to be a realistic one, the federal
courts need not be fearful of destroying the renewal system through
project injunctions. Although the requirement that nonwhites achieve
equal standards in rehousing with whites will inevitably cause slowdowns, in time the problem should be eased. Once LPAs have established formal procedures to rehouse nonwhites, and the effect of open
housing laws has created an impact on the housing market, LPAs
should be able to relocate in a juster fashion.
Courts might also find that the slowdowns have unexpected
remedial effects. Influential local interests that might otherwise have
been unaware of (or, more likely, unconcerned with) the difficulties
of nonwhite displacees may become keenly interested in their adequate
relocation. In the Norwalk CORE situation, if the project is enjoined, other business interests waiting to continue construction on
the project might see fit to use their influence to persuade Norwalk
officials to forego their plans for moderate income apartments, and encourage them instead to construct public housing.' Thus, the displacees
would be rehoused and the area would be renewed. Furthermore,
indirect assistance from the white power structure would become a
continual process. Although whites represent only a minority of the
displacees,8 5 their families, friends, associations, and businesses in some
instances form powerful interest groups that can exert pressure on
town councils and LPAs. By lobbying for better facilities and more
public housing programs, they may prevent a reduction in relocation
services. Thus, as whites protect and improve their standards, nonwhite displacees will also benefit since the adequacy of their facilities
will be measured by the facilities available to the whites.
III. CONCLUSION

The Norwalk court fundamentally asserts that every displacee
must be provided with relocation facilities. This requirement alone
will cause government planning institutions to shift from a merely
collateral concern with displacement to a full-fledged involvement in
the relocation process. The real problem, however, centers on what
standards these facilities are to meet. An examination of the realism
adhered to by the Norwalk court indicates that in the immediate
83 Such action would be highly effective, but may not be within the activity which
a court would order in fashioning relief. The Norwalk court noted that the plaintiffs were not demanding that the defendants end discrimination in the housing market
or find integrated housing for the displacees. See 395 F.2d at 930.
84 Such a result would be particularly advantageous since the Norwalk court
strongly implied the inappropriateness of judicial action concerning the six-acre plot.
See 395 F.2d at 930.
s 5 See, e.g., S. GREE, URBAN RENEWAL AND AmERIcA_& CITms 151 (1965).
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future the goal will be to match nonwhite with white rehousing.
Enforcement of open housing laws, and implementation of special
service programs by the LPAs could provide the primary stimulus for
the equalization process. Furthermore, those groups affected by
project slowdowns would have an incentive to use their influence to
assure adequate relocation.
In the last analysis, then, it seems that the equal protection doctrine rather than section 105(c) will preserve morality within the
urban renewal process. Should the time come, however, when the
nation sees fit to meet its domestic needs, the ideals of the Housing
Act of 1949 and the standards of 105 (c) will not just be "realistically"
applied, but will serve boldly as a Declaration of Rights for all renewal
displacees.

